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Case No. 20140851-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
PAUL DUBRAE WALDOCH, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for object rape, a first degree 
felony, and two counts of forcible sexual abuse, second degree felonies. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0) (West 
Supp. 2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
The victim agreed to give Defendant Paul Waldoch a ride home from 
a party. Instead of directing her toward his home, he tried steer her up a 
nearby canyon. When this misdirection failed, he expressed his desire for 
her and began "vigorously kissing and sucking" on her neck as she drove. 
The "shocked" victim pushed Waldoch away and told him to stop. 
Undaunted, he put his hands down her shirt and pants, rubbing her breasts 
and the outside of her vagina. The victim stopped her car and told Waldoch 
to get out. He refused, put his finger in her vagina, rubbed "really hard," 
and forced her to masturbate him. He then got out of the car and ran home. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The victim testified that Waldoch put his finger "inside" her vagina 
and rubbed her "really hard." She previously told police and medical 
personnel that Waldoch digitally penetrated her. And both prosecution and 
defense experts testified that the victim's injuries were consistent with 
digital penetration. 
1. Was this evidence sufficient for the jury to find penetration? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews all evidence and reasonable 
inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict and reverses only if the 
evidence is so "inconclusive or inherently improbable" that reasonable 
minds must have a reasonable doubt. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 
(Utah 1991) (citation omitted). 
The jury foreman was married to one of the alternate jurors. Neither 
the court nor counsel asked the jurors if their relationship would bias them. 
The alternate juror spouse was dismissed after closing arguments and did 
not participate in deliberations. 
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2.A. Does the fact that a juror and an alternate juror are married to 
each other constitute an exceptional circumstances relieving Defendant of 
his preservation burden? 
Standard of Review. Exceptional circumstances excuse a lack of 
preservation only when an issue was not raised below due to a rare 
procedural anomaly. See State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ,J23, 94 P.3d 
186. 
2. B. Did the trial court plainly err or did counsel render ineffective 
assistance during jury selection by not asking venire members about bias 
between jurors or by not striking one of the spouse jurors? 
Standard of Review. Plain error requires obvious, prejudicial error. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). An ineffective assistance 
claim raised for the first time on appeal is a question of law. State v. Ott, 
2010 UT 1, if 16, 247 P.3d 344. 
Rule 17(k), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires a court to 
admonish jurors before each recess to not discuss the case and to not form 
or express an opinion on the case until the case is submitted to the1n. The 
court took nine recesses during trial; four of these included admonish1nents, 
five did not. None of the pre-recess admonishments included an injunction 
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against forming an opinion, but the opening jury instructions fully informed 
the jury consistent with rule 17(k). 
2.C. Did the trial court plainly err by not giving, or did counsel 
render ineffective assistance by not insisting on, full admonishments before 
each recess and follow-up after each recess? 
Standard of Review. See issue 2.B. 
The prosecutor argued in closing that the victim was credible based 
on her demeanor, consistency, and behavior. He acknowledged that the 
victim had a motive to maintain her story- assuming it was a lie - in order 
to avoid the bad feelings of being branded a liar. He further argued that 
Defendant had motives to lie based on the marital and legal consequences 
he faced. Defense counsel did not object to any of this argument or request 
any curative instruction. 
3.A. Did the trial court plainly err or was defense counsel ineffective 
for not interrupting the prosecutor's closing argument on the ground that it 
inappropriately vouched for the victim's credibility? 
3.B. Did the trial court plainly err for not sua sponte giving, or was 
counsel ineffective for not seeking, a curative instruction on this same 
argument? 
Standard of review. See issue 2B. 
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Defense counsel retained a highly-qualified expert on rape 
examinations, consulted her during the State's expert's testimony, and 
called her to elicit testimony favorable to the defense, including that: the 
physical evidence was equally consistent with consent and non-consent; the 
State's medical witnesses were biased in favor of the victim; and portions of 
the physical exam were inconsistent with the victim's story. 
4. Did counsel render ineffective assistance by not II fully 
appreciat[ing] or mak[ing] use of" his expert's experience and opinions on 
consent or lack of consent? 
Standard of review. See issue 2.B. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-402.2 (object rape); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (conduct of trial). 1 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the State cites to current versions of 
statutes and rules, as they have not materially changed for purposes of 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of f acts.2 
Melissa Sorensen had just gotten off work and was getting gas at a 
service station when she saw her friend Bill with Defendant Paul Waldoch. 
R299:156. Bill asked Melissa if she had any plans that night; Melissa said 
she did not. Id. Bill invited her to come over for drinks at his mother's 
house. Id. Melissa agreed. Id. After a low-key evening of drinking and 
visiting, Bill asked Melissa if she wanted him to wake up his mom to drive 
her home. Id. at 158. Melissa said that she would just stay the night to sleep 
off her drinking. Id. 
The next morning, Bill asked Melissa if she could give Waldoch a ride 
home; Melissa agreed. Id. at 160. They got in the car, and Melissa asked 
Waldoch where he lived. Id. He told her to head "out of town11 toward a 
nearby canyon. Id. Melissa asked, "Dod t you live on the other side of 
town?fl Id. at 160-61. Waldoch asked her how she knew that. Id. at 161. 
Melissa said that she heard someone at the party say that he lived near 
Wendy's. Id. 
2 Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are recited in the light 






As Melissa began driving toward town, Waldoch "[i]mmediately ... 
grabbed [her] neck and started very vigorously kissing and sucking" on it. 
Id. Melissa was "shocked"; she said, "Stop it. What are you doing?" and 
"tried to push him away." Id. Undeterred, Waldoch told her that he 
"wanted this since the first time [he] saw [her]." Id. at 174. He II started 
putting his hands in [her] shirt and down [her] pants," rubbing her breasts 
and vagina under her clothing as she drove. Id. at 162-64. All this time, 
Waldoch continued to misdirect her away from his home, saying that "he 
lived in different areas of town." Id. at 164-65, 173. 
Melissa pulled over multiple times, telling Waldoch to "Get out of the 
car." Id. at 163-65. Waldoch repeatedly refused. Id. When Melissa pulled 
over near a call center, things II got worse": Waldoch "stuck his finger inside 
of" her vagina and rubbed it "really hard." Id. at 164-66; State's Exh. _21 at 2. 
Melissa again tried to dissuade him, telling him that it hurt, that she was 
menstruating, and that he was married. R299:166. Waldoch, still 
undeterred, grabbed Melissa's hand and put it on his penis, forcing her to 
rub it "until he ejaculate[d] all over" her sweater. Id. He then "just got out 
of the car and ran to his house." Id. at 167. 
Melissa was "in shock" and II disgusted." Id. She "went home and 
went to bed for two days." Id. Her vagina felt "extremely bruised inside 
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and out," and was 11just really red and swollen." Id. at 172. After concerned 
friends checked in on her and encouraged her to report what happened, 
Melissa went to the hospital. Id. at 170. There, she underwent a rape exam 
that was "extremely humiliating," requiring her to submit to nude pictures 
and to "re-live it again" by telling "a stranger what happened." Id. at 172. 
The exam revealed bruising on Melissa's rib cage, under her left 
breast, and on both thighs. R298:95-96; State's Exh. 1, 2, 3, 4, 9. She also had 
vaginal abrasions. R298:100-02; State's Exh. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10. These injuries 
were consistent with her story. R298:116. And her story itself remained 
consistent from her written statement to police to her statements to 1nedical 
providers, to her testimony at trial. Compare R298:72-74, 98-99; R299:161-66; 
State's Exh. 20, 21. Further corroboration came via DNA testing, which 
confirmed Waldoch's semen on her sweater. R299:128; State's Exh. 11, 12. 
Defendant's story. Waldoch admitted that he had ejaculated on 
Melissa's sweater, but claimed that it had been consensual. R299:258. He 
denied misdirecting Melissa, rubbing her breasts and vagina, or penetrating 
her vagina. Id. at 260-61, 264-65. He claimed that she had come onto him 
during the ride and that the only contact between them was her kissing and 
masturbating him. Id. at 258,260. 
-8-
B. Summary of proceedings. 3 
The State charged Waldoch with one count of object rape, a first 
degree felony, and two counts of forcible sexual abuse, second degree 
felonies. Rl 19-21. The jury convicted him as charged. R232. The trial court 
sentenced him to a prison term of five years to life on the object rape count, 
and two suspended terms of one to fifteen years on the forcible sexual abuse 
counts. R288-89. Waldoch timely appealed. R292-93. The Utah Supreme 
Court transferred the case to this Court. Order of Sep. 24, 2014. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I: Penetration sufficiency. Waldoch first argues that the 
evidence of penetration was so contradictory as to preclude the jury from 
considering it. But in doing so, he largely fails to account for the victim 
describing two different portions of Waldoch's abuse-an earlier one in 
which he rubbed the outside of her vagina and a later one in which he 
digitally penetrated and rubbed the inside of her vagina. The victim's 
testimony alone was sufficient to prove penetration. It was also 
corroborated by the victim's prior statements and the physical evidence. To 
the extent that other evidence may have cast doubt on the victim's 
3 The pleadings file is numbered in reverse order. The State cites it in 
regular order. 
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assertions, it created merely a factual dispute that the jury was able to-and 
did- resolve against Waldoch. 
Issue II: Plain error/ineffective assistance regarding spouse jurors. 
Waldoch's second set of arguments relate to the jury foreman being married 
to one of the alternate jurors. He argues that (1) having spouse jurors is an 
exceptional circumstance excusing his preservation failures and relieving 
him of his prejudice burden; (2) the court or counsel should have either (a) 
asked the jury panel if their relationships with each other would prejudice 
them, or (b) stricken one of the spouse jurors; and (3) the court or counsel 
should have insisted on admonishing the jurors before each recess not to 
foni1 opinions or discuss the case with each other prior to deliberations, and 
followed up to ensure that each admonishment was followed. 
All of these arguments are unpreserved and inadequately briefed. He 
has thus failed to carry his burden of persuasion on appeal. But his 
arguments also fail under plain error and ineffective assistance analysis. 
As a preliminary matter, the exceptional circumstances doctrine 
applies to rare procedural anomalies, not the facts here. 
Regarding jury selection, Waldoch cannot show plain error because 
he invited any error by passing the jury for cause. He alternatively argues 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for not striking one of the spouse jurors 
-10-
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or at least inquiring into juror biases stemming from relationships with 
other jurors. But Waldoch cannot show prejudice because he has not shown 
that a biased juror sat. 
Regarding juror admonitions, there is no presumption of prejudice 
from a failure to admonish except perhaps where-unlike here-a trial 
court fails to admonish the jury at all. And Waldoch has not shown 
prejudice because he has not demonstrated that the jurors violated the 
admonitions they were given. 
Issue III: Plain error/Ineffective assistance regarding alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct. Waldoch argues that the trial court plainly erred 
and/ or that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's 
closing argument on the basis that the prosecutor vouched for the victim's 
credibility and appealed to the juror's emotions. These arguments are 
unpreserved and inadequately briefed. At any rate, the prosecutor did not 
vouch or appeal to the jury's passions; rather, he made permissible 
arguments to infer the victim's truthfulness from the evidence. 
Because the prosecutor's arguments were valid, Waldoch has not 
shown any error, let alone plain error. And he has not shown ineffective 
assistance because any objection to these valid arguments would have been 
futile. 
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Issue IV: Ineffective assistance regarding use of expert testimony. 
Waldoch finally argues that his counsel was ineffective for not asking more 
questions of his expert medical witness. Because he does not say what those 
questions- or their answers -would be, this claim is inadequately briefed. 
In any event, Waldoch cannot show ineffective assistance where counsel 
hired a highly-qualified expert, consulted her during trial, and called her to 
give testimony helpful to Waldoch' s case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The victim's testimony and corroborating physical evidence 
sufficed to show penetration. 4 
To prove object rape, the State needed to show that Waldoch (1) 
"without the victim's consent"; (2) "caused the penetration, however slight, 
4 Waldoch appears to concede that none of his appellate arguments 
are preserved. Br.Aplt. 39. Though that concession is well-taken on his 
other arguments, it appears precipitous here. Counsel moved after verdict 
to reduce the object rape from a first degree felony to a second degree felony 
based on an alleged lack of evidence of penetration. R299:310. The trial 
court denied the motion. Id. 
In substance, counsel's motion was to arrest judg1nent under rule 23, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure-the standard for which is identical to 
the directed verdict standard. See State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, if 14, 210 P.3d 
288. Counsel thus made a timely, specific motion preserving the 
penetration sufficiency issue. Further, whether or not the objection was 
timely, the trial court ruled on its merits, which would have preserved the 
issue under State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991), and its progeny. 
Thus, the State treats this claim as preserved. 
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of the genital ... opening" of a person over 14; (3) "by any foreign object, ... 
including part of the human body other than the mouth or genitals"; (4) 
"with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to the victim or 
with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-402.2. Waldoch disputes the sufficiency of evidence only 
on the penetration element, asserting that the victim's testimony of 
penetration is insufficient because it was contradicted by both her own 
statements and the physical evidence. Br.Aplt. 25-31. But both the physical 
evidence and the victim's consistent accounts support a finding of 
penetration. 
For purposes of rape and object rape, penetration is defined in case 
law as "entry between the outer folds of the labia." State v. Simmons, 759 
P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1988) (citing 65 Am.Jur.2d Rape§ 3 (1972)). Though 
Waldoch asserts that it is "questionable whether [this] standard applies to 
penetration under" the object rape statute, Br.Aplt. 28, the Simmons court 
was clear that this definition applied to all forms of rape, including object 
rape. See Simmons, 759 P.2d at 1154. 
When reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency, this Court reviews all 
evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict 
and reverses only if the evidence is so "inconclusive or inherently 
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improbable" that reasonable minds must have had a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted). 
Contradictory evidence alone "is not sufficient to disturb a jury verdict"; 
rather, to justify reversal, the evidence must be physically impossible or 
obviously false. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,I183, 299 P.3d 892 (citation 
omitted). 
This standard is "highly deferential." State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, 168, 
345 P.3d 1195 (citations and quotations omitted). And rightly so. The jury's 
role is to determine guilt, and so long as "there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of 
the crime can reasonably be made," appellate review "stops." State v. Mead, 
2001 UT 58, if 67, 27 P.3d 1115 (citation omitted). 
There was ample evidence of penetration here. The victim testified at 
trial that Waldoch repeatedly put his finger or fingers inside her vagina. See 
R299:165-166, 179. This was consistent with her prior accounts. She told the 
physician's assistant at the hospital that Waldoch penetrated her vagina 
with his fingers. R298:74, 79, 83-85. She told the sexual assault nurse 
examiner that Waldoch penetrated her vagina with his hand. R298:98-99. 
And she told police that Waldoch penetrated her with his fingers, though he 
could not get very far because she was wearing a tampon. State's Exh. 21 at 
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2. Her testimony was also consistent with the physical evidence - the 
victim had abrasions on her inner labia and vagina consistent with digital 
penetration. R298:100-03, 116. All this was plainly sufficient to support a 
finding of penetration-that is, that Waldoch's finger at least entered 
"between the outer folds of the labia." Simmons, 759 P.2d at 1154. 
In arguing to the contrary, Waldoch points to various pieces of 
evidence, none of them availing. First, he points to DNA testing excluding 
him as a contributor to the DNA from a swab of the victim's neck. Br.Aplt. 
25; see also R298:126; State's Exh. 13 at 1-3. This, he asserts, calls "into 
question the victim's testimony" that Waldoch "grabbed her and started 
kissing and sucking on her neck." Br.Aplt. 25. But calling testimony into 
question does not render it physically impossible or inherently improbable. 
State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991) ("The mere existence of 
conflicting evidence ... does not warrant reversal."). And given that the 
victim was at home in bed for two days, it is not surprising that Waldoch's 
DNA might not have stayed on her neck, particularly where the State's 
DNA expert opined that "two or three days" seemed like a "pretty long" 
time for another's DNA to remain on s01neone's skin. R298:138. The 
absence of Waldoch's DNA on the victim's neck was not enough to justify 
the trial court in taking the case from the jury. 
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Waldoch next argues that the victim's testimony of penetration was 
undermined by (1) the victim saying that he rubbed the outside of her 
vagina; (2) a medical record allegedly containing no reference to 
penetration; and (3) his expert's testimony that the victim's injuries were 
more consistent with external rubbing than internal rubbing. Br.Aplt. 25-26 
(citing State's Exh. 20), 29-30. Not so. First, the victim was clear at trial that 
there were two instances of vaginal rubbing- the first on the outside, and 
the second on the inside. R299:163-65; see also State's Exh. 21. And both the 
physician's assistant and the sexual assault nurse were clear that the victim 
did report that Waldoch digitally penetrated her, regardless of the content of 
the written reports. See R298:74, 79, 83-85, 98-99. 
Second, the very medical record he cites to undermines his argument. 
Waldoch cites State's Exhibit 20 to support his assertion that it was 
"unlikely that the qualified sexual assault nurse examiner would have 
missed writing down the detail of penetration in the patient's description" 
of the assault. Br.Aplt. 26. Though the victim's description does not 
specifically address penetration, a separate question on the form states, 
"Was there penetration?" State's Exh. 20. The nurse examiner marked 
"yes" for this and wrote a note stating, "by hand to vagina." Id. 
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Third, the defense expert's testimony that the victim's vaginal 
abrasions were more consistent with outside rubbing than inside rubbing 
did not mean that the jury had to speculate to find penetration. The victim 
testified that Waldoch digitally penetrated her, and she reported digital 
penetration to medical and police personnel. R299:165. The sexual assault 
also nurse opined that her injuries were consistent with digital penetration. 
R298:116. 
Neither did the defense expert's testimony render the victim's 
account incredible- it merely rendered credibility a jury question. Though 
the defense expert testified that the victim's injuries were not in the 
expected places, she did opine on cross-examination that the injuries were 
equally consistent with both the victim's story and Waldoch's story. 
R229:226-29, 232-33. The State's expert opined that the victim's injuries 
were consistent with the victim's account. R298:116. Though the State's 
expert was not as experienced as the defense expert, Waldoch cites no 
case-and the State is aware of none-that a jury must believe the expert 
with greater experience. See Br.Aplt. 30. A mere difference of opinion or 
experience between experts cannot justify taking the case from the jury. Cf 
Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if 200 (" [C]ourts are not bound to accept the testimony 
of an expert and [are] free to judge the expert testimony as to its credibility 
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and its persuasive influence in light of all the other evidence in the case.") 
(citation and quotation omitted). Indeed, a "jury is not required to believe 
an expert witness even when that expert's opinion is unchallenged by the 
opinion of an opposing expert." Lyon v. Bryan, 2011 UT App 256, if10, 262 
P.3d 1199. 
In arguing this point, Waldoch also cites State v. Pullman, 2013 UT 
App 168,306 P.3d 827, and State v. Simmons, 759 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1988). But 
both cases are inapposite. In Pullman, the teenage victim testified that 
Pullman "tried to take [her] panties off and stick his dick into [her] butt," 
but that she pushed him away before he could do so. 2013 UT App 168, 
if13. The victim also testified that "[i]t hurt" "there." Id. This Court held 
that this testimony was not sufficient to prove that Pullman touched the 
victim's anus- as opposed to her buttocks. Id. at if 16. 
In Simmons, the victim testified that Simmons "put the tip of his penis 
'on' her labia." 759 P.2d at 1154. The Utah Supreme Court held that this 
was not sufficient to prove penetration-that is, entry beyond the "outer 
folds of the victim's labia." Id. 
In both Pullman and Simmons, the victims' testin1ony specifically 
established lack of penetration. Here, the victim repeatedly stated that 
Waldoch put his finger or fingers "in" her vagina. In the context of female 
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genitalia, "in" can mean nothing less than penetration as defined in 
Simmons. See State v. Peterson, 2015 UT App 129, ,rs, 787 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 
(holding female child victim's testimony that defendant put his finger "in" 
her "front private" sufficient to prove penetration as defined in Simmons). 
Further, in her written statement to police, the victim was even more 
descriptive, stating that Waldoch "did penetrate [her] with his fingers but 
couldn't [get] very far be[cause] of [her] tampon." State's Exh. 21 at 2 
( emphasis in original). 
In sum, the evidence was plainly sufficient to prove penetration, and 
thus the trial court did not err in denying Waldoch' s motion for arrest of 
judgment after the jury convicted of object rape. 
II. 
Defendant has not proven plain error or ineffective assistance 
on any of his jury-related claims.5 
Waldoch next argues that the trial court plainly erred or that counsel 
was ineffective for letting spouses sit as jurors and by not fully admonishing 
the jury before each recess not to discuss the case or form opinions until the 
case was submitted to them. Br.Aplt. 32-37, 42; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 
17(k). 
5 This point responds to portions of Waldoch's points Band D. 
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A. Jury selection and admonishments. 
The jury venire included two married couples: James and Susan 
Rasmussen and Dennis and Pat Crofts. See R298:4, 6, 19-20, 23-24, 26-27. 
During jury selection, the potential jurors were questioned about their 
citizenship; age; ability to understand English; criminal history; physical or 
mental disabilities; family; employment; address; education; hobbies; 
relationships with the parties, witnesses, counsel, the court, and law 
enforcement; opinions on punishment; ability to judge fairly and 
impartially; undue hardship they might have; opinions on alcohol; and 
willingness to follow instructions. Id. at 7-45. 
The trial court then asked both counsel if there were "any questions 
that" they "would like to ask to the jury as a whole or to any individual 
juror." R298:45. The State declined. Id. The trial court asked defense 
counsel if there were "any questions that [he] would like to address." Id. at 
46. Defense counsel replied, "No, your honor." Id. Counsel then exercised 
their peremptory challenges. Id. at 46-47. Of the four spouses in the venire, 
three remained for h·ial: Pat Crofts6 and James Rasmussen as jurors, and 
Susan Rasmussen as an alternate. 
6 In the jury list read by the court, Mrs. Crofts name appears as "Matt 
Crofts." R298:47. Because there was no Matt Crofts in the venire, it appears 
that the transcriber mistook "Pat" for "Matt." 
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The court took nine recesses and admonished the jurors five times 
over the course of a two-day trial. The admonishments had two aspects: (1) 
not to discuss the case and (2) not to form an opinion about the case. 
Recesses 
Dayl 
1. Ten-minute bathroom break 
during jury selection. R298:45. 
Admonishments 
Not discuss case 
Potential jurors told 
"not to talk about 
the case with 
anyone while [they 
were] on break." 
R298:45. 
Not form opinion 
None. 
2. Lunch break, no evidence yet Jurors told not to None. 
taken. R298:49-50. talk about the case 
with other jurors or 
anyone else until 
they had "retired to 
deliberate," and that 
this same injunction 
would apply to "any 
other recesses that 
we take." R298:49. 
Opening jury Opening jury 
instructions told instructions told 
jury that during Jury to "keep an 
recesses to "not talk open mind," to not 
about this case with "form an opinion 
anyone; not family, about the ultimate 
friends, or even each issues in this case 
other," and not to until [they] had 
learn about the case listened to all the 
from media, and evidence and the 
that these restraints lawyer's summar-
were "necessary for ies, along with the 
a fair trial." (R310- instructions on the 
11) law," and to 
-21-
3. Ten-minute recess because a None. 
juror stood up. (R298:104) 
4. Five-minute recess for defense 
counsel to confer with expert. 
(R298:108) 
None. 
"[k]eep an open 
mind until then." 
(R311) 
Also told jurors to 
"consider each 
other's opinion," 
to "reach I their] 
own decision," 
and to not "make a 
decision just to 
agree with every-
one else." (R303) 
None. 
None. 
5. End of first day. (R298:147) Jurors admonished None. 
"not to talk about 
the case with 
anyone and not try 
and learn about the 
case outside the 
courtroom." 
(R298:147) 
Day 2 Not discuss case 
6. Fifteen-minute recess at close None. 
of State's case for defense to 
confer with expert. (R299:206-
07) 
7. One-minute recess at defense 
request. (R299:231). 
None. 
Not form opinion 
None. 
None. 
8. Lunch break. (R299:242-43) Jurors admonished None. 
"not to talk about 
the case with 
anyone, and not try 






9. Close of evidence, one hour None. None. 
and fifteen minute break before 
jury instructions (R299:269) 
Waldoch did not object to any of the admonishments-or lack thereof-nor 
did he request that the court ask the jurors after recesses if they had 
followed the admonishments. Susan Rasmussen was excused from the jury 
after closing arguments and did not participate in deliberations. R299:301, 
306. 
B. These claims are unpreserved and inadequately briefed. 
As Waldoch appears to acknowledge, his jury selection and 
admonishment claims are unpreserved. Br.Aplt. 39. Waldoch attempts to 
overcome his preservation failures by claiming (1) plain error; (2) ineffective 
assistance; and (3) exceptional circumstances. Id. at 40-41. But he does not 
adequately brief any of them. 
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address 
arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 
304 (Utah 1998). The rules of appellate procedure require the argument 
section of a brief to contain "the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
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and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis 
added). An appellant may not just baldly cite authority, but must develop 
that authority and provided "reasoned analysis based on that authority." 
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. And for each unpreserved issue, an appellant must 
brief not only the facts and law governing the underlying claim, but explain 
why it merits consideration due to exceptional circumstances, or merits 
relief when viewed "through the lens" of plain error or ineffective 
assistance. State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, if 21, 167 P.3d 1046. " [ A ]ppellants 
who fail to follow rule 24' s substantive requirements will likely fail to 
persuade the court of the validity of their position." State v. Roberts, 2015 
UT 24, if 18,779 Utah Adv. Rep. 139. 
Defendant's analysis of his jury claims fails to meet the requirements 
of rule 24, and thus fails to meet his burden of persuasion. His discussion of 
plain error, ineffective assistance, and exceptional circumstances spans 
about four pages of his forty-four page brief, and is largely conclusory. This 
does not meet the requirement that he brief each unpreserved issue 
"through the lens" of these doctrines. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ii 21; see also 
State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ,Il8, 789 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (holding 
exceptional circumstances argument inadequately briefed because it lacked 
authority and "reasoned analysis based on" it). In any event, even if this 
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Court were to overlook his briefing failures, these arguments independently 
fail. 
C. Defendant has not shown that spouse jurors constihtte an 
exceptional circumstance excusing his preservation failures. 
Waldoch appears to argue that having spouses on the jury qualifies as 
an exceptional circumstance excusing his failure to object to any incomplete 
or missing jury admonitions. Br.Aplt. 40 (calling spouse jurors a "rare 
procedural anomaly"). As a threshold matter, Waldoch has not even shown 
that spouses sat on the jury together, given that Mrs. Rasmussen was 
excused as an alternate before jury deliberations. Cf State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 
130, 131 (Utah 1983) (holding that where alternate juror dismissed before 
deliberations, the alternate "had no bearing on the jury's verdict"). But 
even assuming that an alternate juror qualifies as a juror for purposes of this 
argument, Waldoch misapprehends the exceptional circumstances doctrine. 
The exceptional circumstances doctrine is not an independent basis 
for relief, but a basis on which to consider the merits of a claim where some 
"rare procedural anomal[y]" outside the appellant's control rendered 
preservation impossible. See State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ~23, 94 
P.3d 186 (quoting Dwrn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n.3). few circmTLStances fit this 
bill. See, e.g., State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ,I26, 253 P.3d 1082 (rejecting 
prison sentence as exceptional circumstance); Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, 
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,I24 (rejecting amendment to information as exceptional circumstance); State 
v. Carter, 2015 UT App 109, ifll n.6, 785 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (rejecting change 
in trial judge as exceptional circumstance); State v. Finlayson, 2014 UT App 
282, if 55, _ Utah Adv. Rep._ (rejecting self-representation as exceptional 
circumstance); State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996) (rejecting 
failure to object to prosecutor remarks as exceptional circumstance). Those 
that do include where "a change in law or the settled interpretation of law 
color[s] the failure to have raised an issue at trial" -such as an amendment 
to a governing statute during the appeal process, In re T.M., 2003 UT App 
191, if 16, 73 P.3d 959 ( citation omitted)- or where a trial judge effectively 
usurps the function of counsel. State v. Beck, 2006 UT App 177, ,IlO, 136 P.3d 
1288. 
Waldoch cites no authority for the proposition that having spouse 
jurors-particularly in rural jurisdictions-is at all "rare," let alone one that 
presumptively results in injustice. Indeed, the jury venire here had two 
married couples: the Rasmussens and the Crofts. See R298:19-20, 23-24, 26-
27. And the great weight of case law from other jurisdictions shows that 
having spouses on juries does not constitute error. See, e.g., Childs v. State, 
357 S.E.2d 48, 56-57 (Ga. 1987); State v. Richie, 960 P.2d 1227, 1244 (Haw. 
1998); Harris v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 40, 49-50 (Ky. 2010); Savoie v. 
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McCall's Boat Rentals, 491 So.2d 94, 102 (La. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Miracle, 
No. CA 85-11-091, 1986 WL 13268, *2 (Ohio Ct. App., Nov. 24 1986) Russell 
v. State, 560 P.2d 1003, 1003 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (per curiam); State v. 
Wilkins, 56 A.2d 473, 473-74 (Va. 1948); Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 406 
S.E.2d 700, 709 (W.Va. 1991). 
Because he has not shown an exceptional circumstance, Waldoch can 
only get relief by showing (1) that the trial court plainly erred in (a) 
conducting voir dire or (b) in its admonishments; or (2) that counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by (a) not insisting on a more extensive voir 
dire or exercising a peremptory challenge to excuse one of the spouse jurors, 
or (b) not insisting on full admonishments before each recess. He has 
shown none of these, because he has not proven prejudice. 
D. Defendant bears the burden to prove prejudice on these 
unpreserved claims. 
Waldoch argues that the incomplete or missing admonishments 
relieve him of his prejudice burden. Br.Aplt. 40. Waldoch is mistaken. 
Where a claim is unpreserved- as Waldoch concedes that this is - the 
burden is always on the appellant to show prejudice, even if he alleges 
srructural error. See Nlaestas, 2012 UT 46, if ii 51, 158 (requiring defendant to 
show prejudice on unpreserved failure to admonish claim and prosecutorial 
misconduct claim); see also Kimmel man v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 n. 7 
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(1986) (explaining that "when an attorney chooses to default a Fourth 
Amendment claim, he also loses the opportunity to obtain direct review" 
under harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, and must instead 
bear the burden of showing Strickland prejudice); State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 
153, 157 (Utah 1989) (applying Strickland prejudice to unpreserved alleged 
public trial violation); State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, iJ17 n.1, 153 P.3d 
804 (" Kimmelman suggests that unpreserved constitutional claims brought 
collaterally under an ineffective assistance of counsel argument must satisfy 
the Strickland actual prejudice standard" rather than Chapman's presumed 
prejudice standard); State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, iJ11, 132 P.3d 703 
("Defendant has the burden of demonstrating prejudice despite the fact that 
he has alleged structural error.") (citing cases); cf State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 
if 18, 122 P.3d 543 ( discussing federal rule that "a defendant claiming 
constitutional error who did not object at trial may only argue plain error or 
ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal and thus must prove prejudice, 
even if the constitutional error claimed on appeal is structural in nature"). 
Waldoch relies on Maestas for the proposition that this Court 1nay 
presume prejudice. Br.Aplt. 40. In Maestas, the court addressed a failure to 
admonish claim in a two-week trial during which the trial court properly 
admonished the jury seventeen times and failed to properly admonish them 
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nine times. 2012 UT 46, 153. Maestas asked the court to presume harm 
whenever a trial court misses an admonishment. Id. at 152. The supreme 
court declined to adopt that rule, and found no harm from the failures to 
admonish where there was no evidence that the jurors did not follow the 
admonitions that the court did give. Id. at ~54. 
The Maestas court noted in dicta that it did not "foreclose the 
possibility that a presumption of harm may be warranted based upon the 
particular circumstances of a case." Id. at ~53. To support this possibility, 
the court cited United States v. Hart, 729 F.2d 662, 668 (10th Cir. 1984). 
Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if 53 n.36. Hart-which also found no prejudice from a 
failure to admonish- distinguished Hart's circumstances from those in 
United States v. Williams, 635 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1980). Hart, 729 F.2d at 668. 
In Williams, the Eighth Circuit presumed prejudice where the trial court did 
not admonish the jury at any time. 635 F.2d at 746. 
Unlike in Williams, the trial court here gave one full- and several 
partial- admonish1nents. See Section II.A. Moreover, Williams is an 
outlier-the vast majority of cases involving a failure to admonish require a 
showing of prejudice. See, e.g., Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if 53 (no prejudice from 
nine failures to admonish); United States v. Richardson, 817 F.2d 886, 889-90 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (no prejudice from two failures to admonish); United States 
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v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595, 602 (2d Cir. 1963) (no prejudice from failure to 
admonish); United States v. Nelson, 102 F.3d 1344, 1347-48 (4th Cir. 1996) (no 
prejudice from total lack of admonishments); Rotolo v. United States, 404 F.2d 
316,317 (5th Cir. 1968) (no prejudice from failure to admonish prior to lunch 
recess); United States v. Weatherd, 699 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1983) (no 
prejudice from single failure to admonish); Hart, 729 F.2d at 668 (no 
prejudice from two failures to admonish); People v. Campbell, 63 Cal.App.3d 
599, 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (no prejudice from three failures to admonish); 
People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258, 280-81 (Ill. 1990) (no prejudice from failure to 
admonish before weekend recess); State v. Ralls, 515 P.2d 1205, 1209-10 (Kan. 
1973) (no prejudice from failure to admonish); People v. Curtis, case no. 
318699, 2015 WL 630396, *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2015) (no prejudice 
from failures to admonish); State v. Deck, 136 S.W.3d 481, 486-87 (Mo. 2004) 
(no prejudice from multiple failures to admonish); Blake v. State, 121 P.3d 
567, 579 (Nev. 2005) (no prejudice from six failures to admonish); State v. 
Thibodeaux, 459 S.E.2d 501, 507 (N.C. 1995) (no prejudice from failure to 
admonish); cf State v. Hines, 307 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1957) (presuming 
regularity of proceedings where record did not show admonishment prior 
to dinner break). But see Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 612 (D.C. Cir. 
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1957) (holding prejudice from failure to admonish where no admonishment 
given prior to week-long recess). 
Waldoch thus bears the burden of showing prejudice. 
The prejudice standard in most ineffective assistance and plain error 
claims is that in Strickland: a reasonable likelihood of a different result 
absent the error. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 
1992). But in matters of jury selection and jury admonition, the prejudice 
standards are different. 
For a jury selection claim, Waldoch n1ust show that an actually biased 
juror sat. State v. King, 2008 UT 54, if if 15-36, 190 P.3d 1283; see also State v. 
Sessions, 2014 UT 44, if 31, 342 P.3d 738 (showing of "' actual juror bias"' 
required to prove ineffective assistance for lacking neutral ground for 
peremptory challenge); State v. An-iaga, 2012 UT App 295, ifl3, 288 P.3d 588 
(counsel's deficient performance during jury selection prejudicial only if 
biased juror sat). Showing "actual bias," of course, requires more than 
merely showing potential or even presumptive bias. See King, 2008 UT 54, 
~,Il8, 30-39 (explaining that requiring showing of mere potential bias would 
be "illogical" and "lead to perverse results"). For example, though two 
jurors in King had "made disclosures that suggested potential bias," King 
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could not show prejudice without showing that his counsel's failure to 
remove the jurors "allowed the seating of an actually biased juror." Id. at 
,I,I19, 47 (emphasis added). 
For a failure to admonish claim, Waldoch must show that the jurors 
actually violated the admonitions they received. See, e.g., Maestas, 2012 UT 
46, ,I54 (holding failures to admonish harmless where "there is nothing in 
the record to indicate that the failures to admonish played any role in the 
juror's conduct"); see also Bean, 560 N.E. 2d at 280 (" [W]ithout any evidence 
that the jurors acted improperly we cannot find that the risk" of discussing 
the case or hearing news reports "resulted in an unfair death penalty 
hearing or a prejudiced jury"); Ralls, 515 P.2d at 1210 (requiring proof of 
"prejudicial misconduct on the part of jurors" from lack of admonition); 
Thibodeaux, 459 S.E.2d at 507 (holding no prejudice where defendant did 
"not content, and did not show, that jurors engaged in any improper 
conduct or conversation" that "tainted in any way" their deliberations). 
Waldoch has not met these burdens on any of his claims. 
E. Defendant has not shown plain error or ineffective assistance 
during jury selec~ion because Defendant passed the jurors for 
cause, no law required inquiry about bias between jurors, 
and he has not shown that a biased juror sat. 
Waldoch first faults the trial court for not sua sponte striking one of 
the spouse jurors during voir dire, or at least asking the jurors whether their 
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relationships with other jurors biased them. Br.Aplt. 32-33. As explained 
above, these arguments are inadequately briefed and should be rejected for 
Defendant's failure to meet his burden of persuasion. But they also fail on 
the merits. 
No plain error. Waldoch argues that the trial court should have 
inquired during voir dire into "the relationship of jurors with each other or 
the impact upon their ability to render an independent decision," or 
alternatively "should have eliminated [Mrs. Rasmussen] and avoided the 
potential risk" that she and her husband would discuss the case or have 
their judgment impaired based on their spouse's opinions. Br.Aplt. 33, 40. 
Because these claims are unpreserved, Waldoch must show plain 
error. But plain error review is unavailable to a party who invites error. 
State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, if15, 128 P.3d 1171. Waldoch invited any error 
in jury selection by passing the jurors for cause. R298:46-47. This Court 
should affirm on this basis alone. 
But in any event, Waldoch has not shown plain error. Plain error 
requires obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993). Error is only obvious if there is controlling law on the subject. 
See, e.g., State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, ,I25, 61 P.3d 1000 (holding error not 
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obvious "where the alleged basis for that error is an ambiguous appellate 
decision"). 
There is no statute or decision in Utah requiring courts to inquire into 
potential bias between jurors. And the general rule nationwide appears to 
be that bias goes to a juror's relationships with the parties, counsel, or the 
judge-not each other. See Challenges for Cause in Jury Selection Process, §5 58 
Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 395 (Westlaw 2015) (discussing sources of bias, 
but not mentioning juror relationships with each other); Wayne R. LaFave, 
Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King, and Orris S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure, §22.3(c) 
(3d ed. 2007) ( discussing potential sources of bias, not mentioning juror 
relationships with each other). "With no controlling appellate decision on 
the issue in Utah and no settled rule across the country, any alleged error in 
this case could not have been obvious to the h·ial court." State v. Zaelit, 2010 
UT App 208U, *3 n.6. 
Likewise, no law in Utah forbids spouses from serving on juries 
together and-as shown above-the great weight of authority from other 
jurisdictions permits spouses to serve together as jurors. 
Neither has Waldoch shown prejudice, because he has not shown 
that a biased juror sat. King, 2008 UT 54, if if 15-36. 
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No ineffective assistance. Waldoch alternatively claims that counsel 
was ineffective during jury selection for not asking the jurors whether their 
relationships with each other would bias them or by not striking one of the 
spouse jurors.7 Br.Aplt. 33, 40. Ineffective assistance requires that counsel 
(1) perform deficiently in a way that (2) prejudices the defendant. Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The prejudice standard for plain 
error and ineffective assistance is the same. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
iJ31 n.14, 12 P.3d 92. 
Waldoch has not shown deficient performance because counsel could 
have reasonably decided that there was no need to ask the jurors about any 
bias stemming from their relationships with each other, particularly where 
no established law required it. See State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 720 (Utah App. 
1997) (noting that "if an error was not obvious to the trial court, it most 
likely was not obvious to trial counsel"). Moreover, counsel could have 
reasonably decided that he had enough information dispelling bias from the 
7 Waldoch appears to concede that he cannot challenge his counsel's 
decision to not use a peremptory challenge on one of the spouse jurors 
based on the "cure or waive" rule in State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, iJ36 n.3, 24 
P.3d 948. The State notes, however, that the supreme court repudiated this 
rule in favor of showing actual bias in Turner v. University of Utah Hosp. & 
Clinics, 2013 UT 52, iJ~25-32, 310 P.3d 1212. Even if Waldoch had 
challenged his counsel's use of peremptory challenges, his claim would still 
fail for the same reasons his voir dire claim fails: lack of prejudice because 
no biased juror sat. 
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questions that were asked. See R298:7-45. And as stated, Waldoch has not 
proven prejudice because he has not shown that a biased juror sat. King, 
2008 UT 54, if if 15-36. 
F. Defendant has not shown plain error or ineffective assistance 
regarding jury admonishments because he has not shown 
that the jury violated the court's admonitions. 
No plain error. Waldoch next argues that the trial court plainly erred 
by not fully admonishing the jury before each recess. Br.Aplt. 40, 42. 
Though the error here was likely plain, it was not prejudicial. 
Rule 17(k), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that at "each 
recess of the court, ... the jurors ... be admonished by the court that it is 
their duty not to converse among themselves, or suffer themselves to be 
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them." Maestas held that rule 17(k) "clearly imposes a 
mandatory requirement on the trial court." 2012 UT 46, ,rs1 n.34. Thus, the 
trial court's missing or incomplete admonishments constituted obvious 
error, at least for those recesses of longer than a few minutes.8 
8 Because the court found no prejudice, Maestas did not reach the 
State's argument in that case that the meaning of "recess" under the rule 
should not include breaks of short length. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,rs1 n.34. 
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But Waldoch has not proven prejudice-that is, that the jurors 
violated the admonishments they did receive. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if 54. 
Waldoch speculates that they might have discussed the case or been 
prejudiced by another juror's views. Br.Aplt. 33 (discussing "potential risk" 
and "heightened risk" from missing admonitions arising from spouse 
jurors). But proof of prejudice must be real, not speculative. State v. Chacon, 
962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998); see also Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ,121, 194 P.3d 
903 (" [P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative 
matter, but must be a demonstrable reality.") (citation and quotation 
omitted). Waldoch' s plain error arguments thus fail. 
No ineffective assistance. Waldoch alternatively claims that counsel 
was ineffective for not objecting to inadequacies in the court's 
admonishments or lack of "follow-up" on them. Br.Aplt. 40, 42. He has not 
shown deficient performance because counsel could have decided that the 
opening instructions adequately instructed the jury on their duties during 
recesses, and that the jury would not have had much opportunity to violate 
the adn1onitions given where the trial lasted only two days and about half 
of the recesses were fifteen minutes or less. Cf Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,I 53 
( explaining in failure-to-admonish case that most recesses were brief and 
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the "jury would have had little opportunity to forget prior admonitions, 
engage in discussion, or be exposed to extraneous information"). 
And again, Waldoch has not shown prejudice because he has not 
demonstrated that the jurors actually violated the admonitions given. See, 
e.g., Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if 53 (no prejudice from nine failures to admonish); 
Richardson, 817 F.2d at 889-90 (no prejudice from two failures to admonish); 
Viale, 312 F.2d at 602 (no prejudice from failure to admonish); Nelson, 102 
F.3d at 1347-48 (no prejudice from total lack of admonishments); Rotolo, 404 
F.2d at 317 (no prejudice from failure to admonish before lunch recess); 
Weatherd, 699 F.2d at 962 (no prejudice from single failure to admonish); 
Hart, 729 F.2d at 668 (no prejudice from two failures to admonish); Campbell, 
63 Cal.App.3d at 610 (no prejudice from three failures to admonish); Bean, 
560 N.E.2d at 280-81 (no prejudice from failure to admonish before weekend 
recess); Ralls, 515 P.2d at 1209-10 (no prejudice from failure to admonish); 
Curtis, 2015 WL 630396, *4 (no prejudice from failures to admonish); Deck, 
136 S.W.3d at 486-87 (no prejudice from multiple failures to admonish); 
Blake, 121 P.3d at 579 (no prejudice from six failures to admonish); 
Thibodeaux, 459 S.E.2d at 507 (no prejudice from failure to admonish); cf 
Hines, 307 P.2d at 889 (presuming regularity of proceedings where record 
did not show admonishment before dinner break); Miracle, 1986 WL 13268, 
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*2 (holding no prejudice from husband and wife sitting on jury where no 
evidence that they discussed case during recesses). Tellingly, Waldoch has 
not moved for remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
to make a record of any violation. 
In sum, Waldoch has failed to establish plain error or ineffective 
assistance regarding jury selection or admonishment. 
III. 
Defendant has not shown plain error or ineffective assistance 
in the prosecutor's closing argument because the prosecutor 
merely argued permissible inferences from the evidence. 
Waldoch next argues that the trial court plainly erred and counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by not interrupting the prosecutor's closing 
argument on the ground that it "vouched for the truthfulness of the victim" 
and appealed to the jurors' "passion and prejudice" by asking them to "'put 
themselves in the victim's place." Br.Aplt. 37-39. He further argues that the 
trial court should have sua sponte admonished the jury before closing 
arguments that they were the judges of credibility, the statements of counsel 
were not evidence, that it was not "appropriate" to feel "sorry for the victiln 
or resentful of" him. Id. at 37. 
These arguments are all unpreserved and inadequately briefed. At 
any rate, Waldoch has not shown plain error or ineffective assistance. 
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A. Closing arguments on the victim's credibility.9 
Both parties addressed the victim's credibility m closing. The 
prosecutor based his credibility argument on the credibility factors in the 
jury instructions. See R306. First, the prosecutor briefly addressed 
Waldoch' s and the victim's respective "personal interest[ s ]": Waldoch had 
an interest in avoiding conviction due to potential jail time and sex offender 
registration, and the victim had an interest in not being branded a liar 
because she "probably wouldn't feel very good about that." R299:274-75. 
When the prosecutor started to ask that the jury weigh those respective 
interests, defense counsel asked to approach the bench. Id. at 275. After the 
unrecorded bench conference, the prosecutor moved on to discuss "other 
bias," stating that Waldoch had a motive to lie because had told his wife 
that "he just cheated on her," but it would "[p]robably" affect his marriage 
if "actually he sexually assaulted another woman." Id. at 276. For the 
victim's part, the prosecutor reasserted that the victim had an interest in 
being considered truthful. Id. at 275. 
The prosecutor then discussed de1neanor, arguing that a show of 
emotion was a good way "to tell if" someone was "lying or not." R299:276. 
He alluded to the victim's demeanor on the stand, saying that if she were 
9 The closing arguments are attached as Addendum B. 
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lying, her emotion would "have to be fake, totally made up," but that if she 
were telling the truth, then it was "was legitimate and sincere." Id. He 
suggested that the jury ask themselves "how [they felt] about that." Id. The 
prosecutor then argued that the victim had told a consistent and reasonable 
story, as evidenced by both her statements and her actions. Id. at 276-77. 
Finally, the prosecutor argued that the victim was believable because she 
had subjected herself to the embarrassment of a pelvic exam and 
participating in the case for over two-and-a-half years. Id. at 277. 
In response, defense counsel argued that the victim had not reacted 
consistently with her story because she did not stop and run away or try get 
help. Id. at 288-91. He also argued that alleged inconsistencies in her 
accounts, her taking Waldoch home, and her refusing medication at the 
hospital belied her story. Id. at 291-94. 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that "every rape victim, every 
sexual assault victim is different in how they respond" to abuse, and not to 
"blame her for what happened to her." Id. at 295. He also responded that 
small inconsistencies in the victim's account did not render it incredible. Id. 
at 296-99. 
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B. These claims are unpreserved and inadequately briefed. 
As explained, rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
requires an appellant to present the "contentions and reasons" for 
overturning a judgment, including the grounds for reaching unpreserved 
arguments. See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ,r21 (requiring unpreserved claims to 
be briefed "through the lens" of an exception). 
Waldoch argues these claims as if they were preserved. They were 
not-he did not object below to the prosecutor's closing argument, nor did 
he request any curative instruction. See R299:274-86 (prosecutor. closing), 
295-301 (prosecutor rebuttal). Waldoch appears to claim that these issues 
are preserved because "[t]hese matters were likely discussed as defense 
counsel requested that the attorneys approach the bench." Br.Aplt. 37. 10 
But there is no record of what occurred during that bench conference. See 
R299:275. 
An appellant may not found preservation on speculation. Rather, he 
must make a complete record of objections, and where no record exists of an 
actual objection, an appellant must supplement or complete the record. See 
Utah R. App. P. ll(c) (describing appellant's burden to ensure an adequate 
record on appeal); Utah R. App. P. 11(h) (providing for record completion 
JO In support of this, Waldoch cites R299:175. This appears to be a 
typo. R299:175 contains no bench conference, but R299:275 does. 
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where something is missing from the record due to II error" or II accident"); 
Utah R. App. P. 23B (providing for record supplementation in support of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims). In the absence of a record, the 
presumption of regularity attaches and record gaps are construed in favor 
of the judgment below. See In re Adoption of Connor, 2007 UT 33, ~16, 158 
P.3d 1097 ("When faced with questions about proceedings in the trial court 
that are not adequately challenged on appeal, we apply a presumption of 
regularity," which assumes that "the evidence and process employed were 
sufficient"); Litherland, 2000 UT 76, if17 (holding that record inadequacies 
are consh·ued in favor of counsel's effective performance). 
Because Waldoch assumes that these issues were preserved, he does 
not argue plain error or ineffective assistance. For these reasons alone, his 
claim is inadequately briefed, and fails to meet his burden of persuasion on 
appeal. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, if18. But even if this Court were to overlook 
Waldoch's briefing failures, he could only prevail on this claim-as with his 
other unpreserved claims - by showing plain error or ineffective assistance. 
Waldoch has not shown either. 
C. A prosecutor does not err, let alone commit misconduct, by 
arguing permissible inferences from the evidence. 
Waldoch styles this claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Br.Aplt. 37. Granted, that label has been employed to describe a broad 
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range of alleged prosecutor errors, from the remarkable to the mundane. 
But it is a misnomer to speak of prosecutorial "misconduct" outside of 
"those extreme - and thankfully rare- instances where a prosecutor's 
conduct actually violates the rules of professional conduct." People v. 
McCranJ, Docket No. 308237, 2013 WL 2662752, *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jun. 13, 
2013) (per curiam). 
True prosecutorial misconduct "is not merely the result of legal error, 
negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety ..... " Pool v. Superior 
Court, 677 P.2d 261, 271-72 (Ariz. 1984). Rather, it is conduct that, "taken as 
a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be 
improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose 
with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial." Id. Thus, 
most "misconduct claims" are "better and more fairly described as claims of 
'professional error' with only the most extreme cases rising to the level of 
'prosecutorial misconduct."' McCran;, 2013 WL 2662752, *3; see generally 
Utah R. Prof'l Conduct 3.8 (special responsibilities of prosecutors). 
Waldoch alleges error in the prosecutor's closing argument. On a 
preserved claim, a defendant proves error only if a prosecutor, s closing 
remarks (1) "call to the attention of the jurors matters they would not be 
justified in considering in determining their verdict," and, (2) a reasonable 
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likelihood of a different result absent the remark(s). State v. Tillman, 750 
P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987). But because this claim is unpreserved, Waldoch 
must show not just error, but obvious and prejudicial error from the 
allegedly improper remarks. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 2014 UT App 56, if39, 
322 P.3d 761 (holding no plain error from prosecutor's remarks). 
Alternatively, he must show ineffective assistance of counsel, which as 
explained, requires both (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice. 
Both prosecutors and defense counsel have "considerable latitude" in 
closing argument and "may discuss fully from their viewpoints the 
evidence and the inferences and deductions therefrom." Tillman, 750 P.2d 
at 560 (citation omitted). Even if the remarks are "colloquial, vigorous, and 
colorful," they may nevertheless fall "within the wide latitude permitted to 
counsel in presenting closing arguments to the jury." State v. Bryant, 965 
P.2d 539, 550 (Utah App. 1998); see also Tillman, 750 P.2d at 556 (holding no 
misconduct where prosecutor responded to "vigorous attack" on credibility 
of State's witness with "unwise and hyperbolic" remark referencing 
Mormon Tabernacle Choir). 
A prosecutor crosses the line if he gives a personal opinion on the 
strength of the evidence or a witness's credibility, see, e.g., State v. Hopkins, 
782 P.2d 475,479 (Utah 1989) (holding improper prosecutor's remark that he 
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was "plainly impressed" with the case evidence); State v. Thompson, 2014 UT 
App 14, if 57, 318 P.3d 1221 (holding improper prosecutor's remark that he 
thought witness was credible); or appeals to the jury's sympathies by asking 
them to put themselves in the victim's shoes. See, e.g., State v. Todd, 2007 UT 
App 349, ifl9, 173 P.3d 170. 
But he is well in-bounds to argue reasonable inferences from the 
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255-56 (Utah 1988) 
(holding no error from prosecutor's argument containing "nothing more 
than his inferences drawn from the evidence"); Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, 
if if 51-55 (same, where prosecutor argued that the jury "had an opportunity 
to view" the victiin and "see that she was forthright," and "told . . . the 
truth"). 
When a defendant objects, the trial court must decide whether the 
remarks were proper or not. But in the absence of an objection, the need to 
show deference to counsel's strategy has made appellate courts "hesitant to 
set a rule which would require the trial judge to intervene in a closing 
argument whenever the judge believes a misstatement of the evidence ... 
has occurred." State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 344 (Utah App. 1993). That is 
the province of opposing counsel. Id. A court invades that province only 
when it can articulate no reasonable basis for not objecting. See State v. 
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Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah App. 1998) (citing multiple reasonable bases 
for not objecting). Moreover, plain error requires that the error be obvious. 
Because "[t]he line which separates acceptable from improper advocacy is 
often difficult to draw," the challenged remark must be "so obviously 
improper" that the trial court had to intervene sua sponte. State v. Larsen, 
2005 UT App 201, ,rs, 113 P.3d 998 (citations and additional quotation 
marks omitted). This same standard applies to whether counsel performed 
deficiently in not objecting. Hall, 946 P.2d at 720 (noting that "if an error 
was not obvious to the trial court, it most likely was not obvious to trial 
counsel"). 
In assessing the prejudice of improper remarks, this Court considers 
all the evidence and the arguments of counsel, as well as any ameliorative 
measures, such as defense counsel's addressing the allegedly improper 
remarks in their closing and any curative instruction from the trial court. 
Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, if if 6-10. Considering the totality of evidence is 
important because "[i]solated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in 
advance to the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, ... are seldom 
carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation frequently 
results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear." 
Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 646-47; see also United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 
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(1988). "[A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an 
ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting 
through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of 
less damaging interpretations." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 
(1974). And the trial court and counsel hold an advantaged position in 
evaluating the impact of any statements on the jury. See State v. Langshaw, 
961 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah App. 1998). Thus, appellate courts do not "lightly 
overturn[]" a criminal conviction "on the basis of a prosecutor's statements 
standing alone." Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, if 6. 
In sum, to get reversal on plain error, Waldoch must show that the 
prosecutor so obviously misstated the evidence or argued something so 
obviously improper that the trial court was required to interrupt and correct 
the argument without being invited to rule on an objection first. See State v. 
Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ,I35, 275 P.3d 1050. He must then show a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result absent the allegedly improper arguments. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 555. 
And as stated, to prove ineffective assistance on these same clahns, 
Waldoch must show both (1) deficient perfonnance and (2) the same sort of 
prejudice applicable to his plain error clailn. 
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D. Defendant has not shown plain error or ineffective assistance 
because the prosecutor properly argued the victim's 
credibility based on permissible inferences from the 
evidence. 
Waldoch alleges that two improprieties in the prosecutor's closing 
required the trial court and/ or counsel to act: (1) that the prosecutor "went 
too far endorsing the victim's position and arguing that the Appellant was 
not credible," thereby expressing a "personal opinion"; and (2) appealed "to 
how the victim would feel if" the jury "determined that she was lying and 
having them relive this shocking experience from her point of view." 
Br.Aplt. 38-39. Waldoch has not shown any error, let alone plain error, 
because the prosecutor did not offer personal credibility opinions or appeal 
to the jury's sympathies, but rather argued reasonable inferences from the 
evidence. State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ~57, 979 P.2d 799 (holding that the 
prosecutor can make "assertions about what the jury should infer from the 
evidence during their deliberations."). For these same reasons, he has not 
shown ineffective assistance. 
No plain error. It was reasonable to infer the victim's candor based on 
her demeanor, her consistent account, and her enduring an embarrassing 
pelvic exam and drmvn-out legal proceedir1gs. R299:276-77; see Thompson, 
2014 UT App 14, ~,I53-55 (holding proper prosecutor's remarks that jury 
had "opportunity to view" the victim and could "see that she was 
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forthright," "had nothing to gain from lying," and "told ... the truth"). 
Likewise, it was reasonable to infer Waldoch' s lack of candor from the legal 
and marital consequences he faced if found guilty. See, e.g., Clark, 2014 UT 
App 56, ifif37-38 (holding no plain error in prosecutor's "suggesting that 
Defendant had a motive to lie and that Defendant's account was fabricated 
and absurd"); Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, if 59 (holding prosecutor fairly 
argued that defendant was "lying, lying," because he had "a lot at stake," 
and "everything to gain by lying"). It was also reasonable to infer from the 
evidence that the victim arguably had a motive to lie because-assuming 
she had lied from the get-go - she would need to continue the lie in order to 
avoid being found out. Cf Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if if30-31 (holding no 
plain error in alleged appeal to jury sympathy where prosecutor 
encouraged jury to "walk in [the victim's] shoes" as a seven-year-old 
witness). Being found out and branded as a liar would make most people 
feel badly. Thus, there was no error, let alone obvious error, in the 
prosecutor's argument. 
Waldoch also argues-without citation to any authority-that the 
trial court ought to have instructed the jurors before closing arguments that 
(1) the statements of the prosecutor were not evidence; (2) they were the 
judges of witness credibility; and (3) that "any appeal to emotion ... was 
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not appropriate." Br.Aplt. 37. There was no error-let alone obvious 
error-here, because the trial court's opening instructions effectively 
covered this ground. 
The jurors were instructed that it was their role to "decide the factual 
issues and to not be influenced by the opinions of the court or counsel; that 
closing arguments represented counsels' summary of their "respective 
views of the evidence"; that they should base their verdict only on facts in 
evidence; that "[w]hat the lawyers say is not evidence"; and to [c]onsider 
the evidence fairly without any bias or sympathy toward either side" See R306-
10 (second emphasis added). Particularly in the absence of a request from 
counsel to cover it again, it would not have been obvious that the jurors 
would have forgotten their charge the day before. And even if the jurors 
had been re-instructed as Waldoch claims they should have been, it would 
have made no difference in the result where the victim's story was 
consistent with her injuries and behavior, and Waldoch showed no 
plausible motive for her to fabricate the allegations against him. See 
Statement of Facts. 
In sum, Waldoch has shown no error, let alone obvious error. And 
even if there were some error, the remarks that Waldoch appears to 
challenge would have made no difference in the result where the remarks 
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were brief, Waldoch had an opportunity to respond to them, the jury was 
instructed that the statements of counsel were not evidence, and the 
evidence of Waldoch's guilt was strong. R307; see generally Larsen, 2005 UT 
App 201, iJif 6-10. 
No ineffective assistance. Because the prejudice standard for ineffective 
assistance is the same as that for plain error, Waldoch' s ineffective 
assistance argument fails on the same bases. Further, Waldoch has shown 
neither deficient performance nor prejudice because the prosecutor's 
argument was proper, rendering any objection futile. State v. Kelley, 2000 
UT 41, 'if 26, 1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel."). And even if there were some arguable 
impropriety, counsel could also have reasonably chosen not to object in 
order to avoid drawing attention to the remark or being seen as 
obstructionist. See Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ,I,I36-40 (holding no ineffective 
assistance from failure to object to proper argument and discussing possible 
strategic purposes for withholding objection). 
IV. 
Trial counsel effectively used a highly-qualified expert to 
support the defense of consent, and any alleged deficiencies 
are entirely speculative. 
Waldoch finally argues that his counsel was ineffective because he 
did not "not fully appreciate or make use of" his expert's "impressions 
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about consensual versus nonconsensual findings" where she "had more to 
say." Br.Aplt. 40, 42. This argument is inadequately briefed under the 
standards discussed above. Though Waldoch cites to the correct standard 
for ineffective assistance, he does not adequately apply it to the facts of this 
case because he does not explain what counsel left undone and why counsel 
was constitutionally required to ask more than he did. See Br.Aplt. 40-41. 
And though he addresses prejudice relating to his other arguments, see, e.g., 
Br.Aplt. 43, he does not even cursorily address prejudice on this argument. 
Under the standards discussed above, this falls well short of meeting his 
burden of persuasion under rule 24. 
At any rate, the record shows that counsel adequately used his 
highly-qualified expert to support a consent defense. Ms. Byner-Brown was 
a longtime forensic nurse examiner who had conducted more than 4,000 
rape exams over 20 years and helped to design the Code-R kit used on the 
victim here. R299:210-12. Counsel consulted her during the State's case to 
prepare for cross-examination. See R298:104; R299:206-07. Her testimony 
helped to counter the emergency room doctor's opinion that the victim's 
vital signs were abnormally high; explained that the victim's bruises could 
have been accidental and unrelated to the alleged abuse; and minimized the 
State's nurse expert's testimony about the seriousness of the victim's 
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vaginal injuries and the extent to which they were consistent with her story. 
R299:217-30. 
This far surpasses counsel's efforts in State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, 262 
P.3d 1, to which Waldoch compares this case. Br.Aplt. 41-42. In Lenkart, 
counsel was held to be ineffective for failing to test a Code-R kit and hire an 
expert to opine on the significance of the results, which supported the 
defense. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, ,r,r3S, 41. Here, counsel hired a highly-
qualified expert and had her extensively opine on the extent of the victim's 
injuries, their consistency with her story, and the validity of other medical 
providers' opinions. Because anything else the expert would or could have 
said is unknown, it is speculative to find counsel's performance either 
deficient or prejudicial. See Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 (explaining that 
ineffective assistance claim must not be speculative). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on July 13, 2015. 
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RULE 17. THE TRIAL. UT R RCRP Rule 17 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 17 
RULE 17. THE TRIAL 
Currentness 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right 10 appear and defend in person and by counsel The defendant shall be 
personally present at the trial with the following exceptions 
(a)( I) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not pu111shable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to 
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have 
the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, 
or obstreperous conduct 
Upon appl icat1on of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order 
(b)( I) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(b)(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody, 
(b)(3) felony cases when defendant 1s on bail or recognizance; and 
(b)('I) misdemeanor cases when defendant 1s on bail or recognizance 
( c) A II felony cases shall be tned by jury unless the defendant waives a Jury in open court with the approval of the court and 
the consent of the prosecution 
vi ( d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the 
court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial ofan infraction 
RULE 17. THE TRIAL, UT R RCRP Rule 17 
----- .... --·--·- ....... ---- .•..... ·-·---·•·-··-·-·--··-···-··--··-·-·--·-------····-·•---·--··------------------
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation 
in writing or made orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of jurors less 
than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the following order: 
(g)( I) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(g){2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense may make an opening statement or reserve 
it until the prosecution has rested; 
(g}(3} The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(g)( 4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(g)(S) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury; and 
(g)(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the 
argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument. The court may set 
reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
{h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using 
the alternate juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors remaining. 
Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial ordered. 
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to a witness as provided in this section. 
(i)( I) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the process to ensure the jury maintains its role 
as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any question from a juror 
and may discontinue questions from jurors at any lime. 
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the jurors that they may write the question as it 
occurs to them and submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the jurors that some 
questions might not be allowed. 
j i · . f' '. •. '! ; . , r~i -. • • . •. J ' 
RULE 17. THE TRIAL, UT R RCRP Rule 17 
(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the question. 
The judge may disallow a question even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written question in the 
court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The 
~ question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to examine the witness 
alter the juror's question. 
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of an 
officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall 
be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak to them 
nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time. 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by 
the court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, 
any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case 
is finally submitted to them. 
(I) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been 
received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits 
ofunusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take 
notes during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall provide jurors with 
writing materials anu instruct the jury on taking and using notes 
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in some convenient place under charge of an 
officer until they agree upon a verdict or arc discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the court, 
the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except 
to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person 
the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall 
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the cou11. The court may then direct that the JUI)' 
be brought before the court where, in the presence or the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry 
or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion 
respond to the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the response 
thereto shal I be entered in the record. 
(o) If the verdict rcndcn:J by a jury is mcorrect on its face, it m:1y be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or 
the jury may be sent out again. 
·~ (p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the com1 may issue an order 
dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof~ upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to 
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense 
RULE 17. THE TRIAL, UT R RCRP Rule 17 
Credits 
[Amended effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.] 
Editors' Notes 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Paragraph (/). The committee recommends amending paragraph (/) to establish the right of jurors to take notes and to have 
those notes with them during deliberations. The committee recommends removing depositions from the paragraph not in order ~ 
to permit the jurors to have depositions but to recognize that depositions are not evidence. Depositions read into evidence will 
be treated as any other oral testimony. These amendments and similar amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure will make 
the two provisions identical. 
Notes or Decisions (339) 
Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 17, UT R RCRP Rule 17 
current with amendments received through April 15, 2015. 
Lnd of DorunH'nl 
§ 76-5-402.2. Object rape, UT ST § 76-5-402.2 
•-- ~---------.~·-••----·-·----
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 5. Offenses Against the Person (Refs & Annos) 
Part 4. Sexual Offenses (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-402.2 
§ 76-5-402.2. Object rape 
Currentness 
(I) A person who, without the victim's consent, causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of another 
person who is 14 years of age or older, by any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, including a part of the human 
body other than the mouth or genitals, with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to the victim or with the intent 
to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, commits an offense which is a first degree felony, punishable by a tenn 
of imprisonment of: 
(a) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b) or (c), not less than five years and which may be for life; 
(b) except as provided in Subsection ( I )(c) or (2), 15 years and which may be for life, if lhe trier of facl finds that: 
(i) during the course of the commission of the object rape the defendant caused serious bodily injury to another; or 
(ii) at the time of the commission of the object rape, the defendant was younger than 18 years of age and was previously 
convicted of a grievous sexual offense; or 
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the commission of the object rape, the defendant was 
previously convicted of a grievous sexual offense. 
(2) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection ( I )(b ), a court finds that a lesser term than the term described in Subsection (I) 
(b) is in the interests ofjustice and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the court may impose a term of imprisonment 
of not less than: 
(a) IO years and which may be for life; or 
(h) six years and which may be for life. 
(3) The provisions of Subsection (2) do not apply when a person is sentenced under Subsection ( I )(a) or (c). 
(4) Imprisonment under Subsection ( I )(b), ( I )(c), or (2) is mandatory 111 accordance with Section 76-3-406. 
§ 76-5-402.2. Object rape, UT ST § 76-5-402.2 
Credits 
Laws 1983, c. 88, § 19; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 8; Laws 2007, c. 339, § 14, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 340, § 1, eff. May 
S, 2008; Laws 2013, c. 81, § 6, eff. May 14, 2013. 
Notes of Decisions (6) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-402.2, UT ST§ 76-5-402.2 
Current through 2014 General Session. 
End ur Ducumcnt 
-·--•·-·--·-~--·---·-·--·---------
,{: WIS Thomson Rcut..-rs No c:l:1im 1.0 miginal U.S. Gowmmcnt Wmks. 
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1 if you were going to decide the case, because you still may, 
2 all right? 













prosecution. He will speak to you, Mr.. VanDyke, and then 
Mr. Leigh and the defense will speak to you. Then Mr. VanDyke 
has the opportunity to speak to you again. The reason he gets 
to chances -- there are two reasons for that. One is Lhat the 
State bears the burden of proof. So he gets two opportunities; 
and second is because in fairness each side should have the 
opportunity to respond to what the other side has said. So 
first we' 11 hear from Mr. Van Dyke an·d then from Mr. Leigh. 
Mr. VanDyke. 
MR. VANDYKE: Thank you, your Honor. Thank you all. for 
being here. Thanks for coming back. Again, your participation 
makes sure that we have the greatest criminal justice system, 










even though it was difficult, not just to give up two days in 
your lives, but because of what you had to listen to while you 
were here. 
It's my chance to -- it's my last chance to persuade 
you, to help you see the importanL things that I've seen com~ 
through, and to help you as you later deliberate, maybe some of 
th~ things you should di~cuss. 
This has turned out a little bit interesting, I think. 





don't know what happened, but they gathered some evidence. 
That's a little bit helpful for you in making your decision. 
There's DNA evidence that:'s pretty conclusive that defendant 
4 was t:here and he ejaculated. There's some injuries that 
5 occurred. They support the victim's story, the alleged 
6 victim's story; but you could also disregard that stuff. 
7 According to the vie -- the expert that testified today, 
8 you could also disregard a lot of those injuries. So that 


















So the crux of the case comes down to who are you 
going to believe? Are you going to believe the defendant and 
the story that he told you today, or are you going to believe 
the alleged victim and the story t:hat she told you? 
If you look in your instructions, on No. 12 there's 
an instruction that helps you to ~hink about some of the things 
on how to make that decision. I'm asking you to believe the 
victim, the alleged victim and not the defendant, obviously. 
Here's some good things to think about, okay? 
Personal interest. Does the witness have a personal 
interest in how the trial comes ou~? Does the defendant have 
a personal interest in how this trial comes out? Absolutely. 
Right? There's so much at stake for him. He's personally 
interested in the outcome today. So does that mean he has a 





The victim, the alleged victim, Melissa Sorenson, does 
she have a personal interest in how the trial comes out? Yeah, 
she probably does, because she's made a statement. She's made 
4 that same statement here in Court. She's claiming that she was 
5 sexually assaulted, and if you decided that she was a liar then 
6 she would probably feel like she was a liar or she probably 
7 wouldn't feel very good about that. So she kind of has a 
8 personal interest, too. 






you know, not going to jail, not being a sex offender. You get 
to think about that and weigh that out. Otherwise, does the 
witness have some other bias or 
MR. LEIGH: Your Honor, may we approach. 
(Discussion at the bench off ~he record> 
15 MR. VANDYKE: Okay, other bias. Does Melissa Sorenson 
16 have some other bias to testify a certain way? Does she have 
17 another bias or motive to testify a certain way? Okay, some 








exist. I mean, she's told friends, she's told people what 
happened to her. If she lied to them, she'd probably have to 
keep the same story, right, because she probably wouldn't want 
to make people think she's a liar. So she's probably going to 
keep the same slory. So sure, maybe sh~ has some other bias, 
if she lied the very first time, right? 













testify a certain way? Sure. He told his wife. Apparently he 
told his wife about this circumstance and played it off to her 
that he j~st cheated on her. Now, if it came out today that 
no, actually he sexually assaulted another woman, is that going 
to affect his relationship with his wife? Probably. 
Demeanor. You saw both of them testify today. There's 
not really a good way, just by looking at somebody, to tell if 
they're lying or not. Sometimes we have impressions, especially 

















tell if that emotion is fake or real. 
So remember what you saw from Ms. Sorenson and how 
she acted en the stand; and if she was lying, that would all 
have to be fake, totally made up by her, all of the emotion 
that she displayed to you, completely fake. If she was telling 
the truth, then the emotion she showed to you was legitimate 
and sincere. So ask yourself how you feel about that. 
Consistency. Look and see if their statements 
if their stories were consistent, acknowledging memory and 
reasonableness. You know, reasonableness is going to be one 
to think about. Go through the story and ask which one of them 
is reasonable. So that's something you can consider. 
So in regards to Melissa Sorenson, if she were lying, 
and she initiated the sexual contact, why wo~ld she later be --
s~ay at home in bed for two days over at Atkinsons? Why would 



























was sexually assaulted? 
Why would she then go to the emergency room, subject 
herself to this really horrible exam, you know, even the expert 
witness that you listened to today said that was terrible. 
You know, you get up there, yo·.1' re sitting in stirrups while 
somebody's exe1111ining yout pelvic area. Why would she subject 
herself to that if she were lying? What motivation could she 
have for that? I want you to think about that. 
t<lhy would she -- I mean, it happened in 2011, Memorial 
Day 2011. Here it is, start of 2014. She's been involved -- I 
mean, this has been an outstanding case since that time. Why 
would she subject herself to that if she -- if this was all a 
lie? That's a question I think that's really important for you 
to discuss and think about. 
There's a lot of evidence in this case, a lot of 
exhibits, a lot of stuff for you to look through, and you'll 
have that opportunity. You'll have the opportunity to read 
everybody's statements, go over everybody's reports. 
Let me talk for a minute about the DNA report, okay? 
It's really confusing. I've read it through myself several 
times. You know, I've sat -- you listened to the expert, and 
she did a really good job of explaining that to you. When you 
read that report it's not going to be as easy to understand. 
® 
So let me go back over that part. ® 






























is t.hat there were two different submissions. The important 
pa~t from the first submission, that rape kit, is the neck 
swab, and then the second submission wit.h the sweater. 
The first test that the DNA expert goes over is the 
serology, but that's just to determine if there are bodily 
fluids, okay? On the next swab she found that there was 
saliva; and on the sweater she found (inaudible). Then the 
second part of the test is to determine that there's -- if 
there's DNA that match -- well, not that it {inaudible), but 
to match the DNA. 
So she had a central sample from Melissa Sorenson, 
that she knew that it was Melissa Sorenson, that she had her 
DNA. She also had the mouth swab from the defendant that she 
had to see if his DNJl.. compared, okay? The next swab that shows 
saliva showed Melissa Sorenson's DNA is a match, and some other 
person. The minor profile is how she -- Melissa Sorenson was 
the major profile, and someone else was the minor profile, 
okay? We don't know if !twas saliva or skin that those DNA 
came from. We just know Lhat Lhose two DN.l\. came from the 
sweater. 
When they did -- when she did the DNA sample of the 
sweater, the seminal fluid, okay, she separates that into two 
because she found -- on that. one she could determine yes, there 
is DNA from specifically serninaj fluid. So that's the serninal 


















fraction. Because of the way they can test, they can tell. 
Unlike the DNA from the saliva when they can't tell where the 
DNA comes from on this, on the sweater they can tell, yes, this 
is from the seminal fluid, the sperm, and this is from skin 
cells, right? 
The sperm came back as a match to Paul Waldoch, and 
then the skin, there was Melissa Waldoch and someone else's 
{inaudible). Please don't get too concerned about that, okay? 
If I rubbed my hand on your shoulder, my skin DNA would get on 
your clothes. That's what the DNA experts told us, okay? 
You know, maybe the defense attorney's going to get up 
here and say, "Oh, well, there was some huge orgy going on, and 
there must have been all sorts of people, you know, brushing 
up against her and doing all sorts of things." Well, first of 
all, there's no evidence of that. The defendant himself says, 
"Yeah, (inaudible) party. We sat, you know, we watched TV and 
17 we drank. Then in the morning we left," okay? So put that out 
18 of your mind, okay? His sperm is on her sweater. That's the 
19 important part, okay? 
20 Some other important instructions for you to review is 
21 starting at 29, Count I ar.d the elements that I have to prove; 
22 30 is Count I!; 31 is Count III. On each one of them I have to 
23 prove that the defendant Paul Waldoch -- that's proven, okay, 
24 no question about it. 




















intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, 
okay? Both witnesses, both Melissa So?enson and Paul Waldoch 
have told you that he ejaculated, okay? There's ! mean, I'm 
not (inaudible) you know, go back to sexed 101, but when 
that happens to a male, that's usually beca~se of a sexual 
gratification, right? So that's pretty easy to determine, 
right? 
On object rape I have to prove that Paul Waldoch 
caused the penetration however slight of the genital opening. 
So when they were there at the Zion's Call Center and Melissa 
Sorenson said, "This time when he stuck his hand in my pants he 
put his finger inside my vagina," that's Count I for you there. 
She's another person. She's over 14 years of age. If you're 
14 finally wondering why I asked if she was over 14, that's why, 
15 okay? 










consent, okay? Then I come back to {inaudible). The defendant 
says, "She initiated this with me,n and while he claims that he 
didn't put his finger in her vagina 
that's really (inaudible). 
u on Count I, okay --
On Count II, the specific act, while they were driving 
he takes his hand -- he's rubbing on her. He sticks his hand 
under her shirt and touches both of her breasts. He even 
tcuches ~he nipples, according to her testimony, okay: So 
on element two that's satisfied by ULuucheJ the breasL of a 
-280-
1 female." 
2 On Count III, this is where they're also at the parking 
3 lot. He has his penis out. He grabs her hand, sticks her hand 
4 on his penis, he has his hand around her hand and he's going up 
5 and down and he ejaculates on her, okay? Under element No. 2, 
6 that's -- the last part of that sentence, "he caused another to 
7 take indecent liberties with the actor er another." There's an 
8 additional instruction that tells you how to determine what an 
9 indecent liberty is. Please don't spend time on that, right? 
10 That's an indecent liberty, if there ever was one. 
11 So what happened? What happened? On May 29 th of 2011 














She had a whole shift that day, she was tired. On her way 
home she stopped at a gas station and saw her friend Bill, 
and with Bill was the defendant Paul Waldoch. They had a 
brief conversation wh~re Bill invited Melissa to his house 
for some drinks. 
Melissa is -- she has some kids that live with her 
and they weren't with her at that time. They were spending 
some time with their dad. So she had a free weekend. So she 
decided to go to Bill's house. She first went home to freshen 
up, and then went td her friend Bill's house -- Bill's mom's 
house, just to the north end of Kanab. 
She had some drinks enough that she didn't feel 





1 Bill's mother was asleep, and so she waited it out. She drank 
2 some water, and then at 7 a.m. she felt comfortable enough 
3 to drive home. The defendant Paul Waldoch was there and he 
4 couldn't drive home because he was -- he still had too much 
5 alcohol in his system, so he asked for a ride home. He gets 
6 in the car with Melissa, and they come out -- (inaudible)? 
7 MR. HANNA: Yes. Judge ordered me, sorry. 
8 THE COURT: Sorry, Mr. Hanna, you close your eyes and 
9 I know you may or may not be, but it looks like you're fighting 
















MR. VANDYKE: I'~ trying to be interesting here. 
MR. HANNA: No, no, no, no. 
MR. VANDYKE: Okay, so they get out on the road and 
he says, "Take a left,• on Highway 89. What's that direction? 
Nothing. Ask yourself why he asked why he told her to go 
that direction. She's not a dummy. She's heard before that 
he lives on the other side of town. So she turns right, and 
essentially right at that point he starts to assault her. He's 
rubbing her and he's touching her and he says -- what does he 
say? He says, "I've been waiting for this since the first time 
I saw you." 
She's driving. She drives. She's all over the road. 
She keeps saying, 'No, den' t touch me." They keep drive -- she 
stops a couple times. Where does she remember st.opping? The 



























a restaurant down here in town. Now, why does Houston's -- why 
did she remember stopping there? She's -- she's a waitress, 
right? She's at restaurants all the time, so she remembers 
stopping in front of a restaurant, okay? 
They keep driving. H~ keeps, you know, putting his 
hand down her shirt, putting his hand down her pants. Eventu-
ally they pull into this parking lot here at the Zion's Call 
Center, okay? What's past that? Not much. Okay. So if 
you're wondering why do they stop there? There at the other 
side of Kanab and maybe subconsciously she knows MI can't drive 
past that point. There's nothing out there.ff This whole time 
she's looking at other people, looking at cars. Those are the 
two thoughts that are going through her head, okay? 
Eventually she gets to a point where she stops, and 
that's where Mr. Waldoch puts his hand inside of her vagina, 
and he pulls out his penis, grabs her hand, sticks her hand 
on his penis, and eventually ejaculates. He still won't get 
out of her car, but he kind of indicates where to go towards 
his house. She drives a little bit further and drops him off. 
Now, were there -- do you think there were no people 
out there that morning and no cars out at all? Now, she drove 
past guic.e a lot of businesses, right, at: 7 a.m. That's not 
too early, okay? Now, the defendant also says, "Yeah, t:1ere 
were no people," but he says there were cars. I'm sure there 





























But what happens when people are in shock? Are you 
thinking clearly? When a si:~ation like that happens, you're 
not prepared for it, are you thinking clearly? Probably not, 
okay? There's two thoughts in her mind which is keep driving, 
look for cars a~d people; but as she's fighting to keep him 
off her, do you t~ink she's going tc see a car, she's able to 
distinguish cars or distinguish people? It's probably extremely 
difficult for her., okay? So, yeah, that's probably one point 
where she's wrong. There probably were some cars out there, 
here and there, but don't hold that against her, because she 
was in shock, okay? 
Let me -- let me talk a little bit about that. Police 
officers are a group of people tha: do a lot of training so 
they can act correctly ~hen chey're 1n stressful situations 
when things arc happeni~g that are unexpected, okay? So like a 
police officer will go cut to the shooting range and he doesn't 
just get his weapon and start shooting and try to be accurate, 
right? T~ey train for conditions where they're going to be 
shot at, okay? So, you know, they'll -- they' 11 be shooting 
and then take two steps, and shoot, and take two steps, right? 
Because they're training their body to do that. 
Why is that important? Because if somebody's shooting 
at you, you don't ~ant to be 3 standing target, right? So 
you've got to move around. So ~hey train that way, but in that 


























If you played sports, you practice over and over again, you 
know, like basketball, they practice free throws, you know, 
that same motion, that same motion over and over again, so when 
you're in a game and it's a stressful situation, you don't have 
to think about it. Your body already knows, and so already 
knows what to do. 
There's a really interesting story about training, 
it's also about police officers. About 50 years ago there 
was a string 6f bank robberies across the country. The FBI 
was involved, and on a couple of situations they -- they got 
the robbers right at the bank, and there was a shootout. 
After everything calmed down, there were some FBI 
agents that were shot and killed, and they found them laying 
on the ground with the copper bullet casings in their hand. 
Everyone thought this was so strange at the time. After they 
were shot did they fall on the ground and start picking them 
up? I mean, what's going on? 
Well, they went back and they looked at how these 
officers trained. When you shoot a gun, you know, the bullet 
casing comes out. It just flies out, and it pretty much just 
falls on the ground. Then afterwards, if you're responsible, 
you have to go and pick it up. That's really annoying, right? 
Because you're done with your training and then you have to go 
out, and there could be hundreds of bullet casings that you've 
















So these off -- these fBI agents had got in the habit 
of after they shot, t~ey could catch the bullet casings in 
their hand, and they had trained that way. So when they got to 
the bank robbery and tha~ instinct kicked in, in that stressful 
situation, they =aught the bullet casings. While they were 
6 somebody was shooting at the~. they still caught the bullet 









were still in their hands. 
Do you think Melissa Sorenson was trained to know what 
to have to do when (inaudible), or do you think that her body 
was in shock? Her mind was stressed, and she probably did some 
weird things. You might think that why didn't she just park 
that car and get out and run and yell and scream? Yeah, why 
didn't she do that? I don't know. 
She was really stressed out. There's also a really 






t-lhy -- why didn't she stop the first time instead of continuing 
to drive? We don't know why. We do know that she was stressed 
out and she was shocked by being sexually assaulted. 
I'm asking you to go in that room and really think 
about the evidence, who to believe here today. At the end of 
22 your deliberations I'm asking you to find the defendant Paul 
23 Waldoch guilty of Count I, object rape; Count II, forcible 
24 
25 
sex,Jal abuse; and Count III, forcible se:-:ual abuse. Thank you. 



























MR. LEIGH: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, Mr. Van 
Dyke, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, thank you for your time 
(inaudible). Perhaps (inaudible) situation is that {inaudible) 
sit there for eight hours each day and going through all this 
and listening to all this evidence, we are grateful for you 
serving on this jury this day. 
As you look at this case I want you to remember some 
things. First is there's some -- there's various burdens that 
the State well, that there are in the legal field. The 
first one is reasonable suspicion. It's way down here. It's 
when police officers just kind of s~spect something's going 
on, and the police just kind of believes that. 
Then a little bit higher is the probable cause 
standard. It's possible something has happened and probably 
is happening. That's still a criminal standard. It's just a 
little bit higher up here. Then you've got a little bit higher 
that's required and tha~•s in most civil actions and it's kind 
of a balancing thing, you know, which one weighs -- which one 
weighs the most. Then you've got a little bit higher here in 
civil cases and certain types of civil cases, and that's clear 
and convincing evidence. It's (inaudible) a lot of emphasis on 
one side that outwelghs the other. 
Criminal cases the evidence has to be clear up here. 
Has to be beyond a reasonable doubt. :t has to be crystal 















to is we want to protect the innocent from an injustice, and 
prevent a miscarriage of justice. That's why it's such a 
{inaudible). 
Mr. VanDyke mentioned (inaudible) not to spend a lot 
of time I think on the definitions, but you need to spend some 
time on this case, including the definitions. The more time 
you spend, the more you realize that there is reasonable doubt 
in this case. You really need to look at the big picture, the 

















Let's go through some things. Let's go through this 
driving route that we have here. It started at the Victorian 
Inn over here, proceeded on Highway 89. Ms. Sorenson was 
driving the vehicle. She started driving across from Victorian 
(inaudible). She turned right onto 89. She stated once you 
turn on 89, that's what started to take place. Very early on. 
This is not way down 89, but this is right when she turned onto 
there. 
She claimed that she was looking for any person to 
find that she could contact, but she couldn't see anyone. Now, 
Mr. VanDyke, he ultimately says, "Well, we've got there's 
probably people out there," but she said -- he said, wwell, she 
probably wasn't focused." He went into police officers and how 
they' re focused (inacldible). She says, "If I found a public 
place where I could see people,n that he would be scared. She 

















was looking for a way out, in her own words there. 
She stated that she stopped several times along the 
way, three times. That's what she put on the -- sat on the 
witness stand and reported several times. She said she stopped 
in front of Houston's. This was the morning of the 31~, some-
time 7 o'clock -- between 7 and 7:30. Houston's is open at 
7 o'clock in the morning. 
There's no evidence that he was grabbing her, holding 
her, preventing her from leaving that car. In fact, she stated 
that she could have left, she could have ran away, she could 
have ran to those places, but she didn't do that. She chose 
not to do that. She could have left harm's way. She could 
have gotten out of that situation. You need to look at that. 
Why didn't she get out of this situation? She was trying to 
find someplace to do that. Well, because she really wasn't. 
16 This was a consensual situation we had, and not a rape. 
17 She had numerous opportunities to pull into places 
18 where -- and I went through those with her. Keep in mind 
19 that this was between 7 and 7:30 on May 30t~. This was the 
20 tourist season. This was (inaudible}. She passed several of 
21 these places and claimed she didn't see anyone at any of these 
22 places. Day's Inn, (Inaudible), Four Seasons Motel, Sinclair 
23 Service station, Treasure T=ail Motel, Best Western Motel, 
24 
25 
Aikin's Lodge, Shell Gas Station, Perry Ledge. Of real 
































station. Where would we go for safety? 
Now, she would -- she had -- she claimed (inaudible) 
she had such an awareness that she said, "Oh, I didn't see nay 
cars over there. So I wasn't going to go there." (Inaudible0 
police s~ation, you go there. If you pull into a police station 
is someone going to stick around and assault -- would they 
stick around after you pull into a police station? Of course 
nor.. 
She went by Samec, right on the corner there. She 
could have easily pulled into Samec, open 24 hours a day. She 
could have pulled right there, she could have run in there and 
got out of harm's way. She could have been -- she could have 
pulled into Glazier's Market, Honey's Market, went in there and 
got away. Did she do that? No. 
She could have pulled into any of these businesses and 
attacked her attacker. She could have bit him, she could have 
hit him, scratched him, any way to get out of harm's way. She 
didn't do that. All of these thi~gs she forgot to do. That's 
because this is a consensual (inaudible). 
(Inaudible) no DNA of my client found en the victim's 
neck. It was her DNA, Melissa's Dl~A, but no DNA from rny client. 
There was apparently unknown contributor on the neck as well. 
Also, the DNA e½pert testified L~at 1n seminal swab that was 
found on the sweater, there was also an unknown DNA and it was 



























Where did they come from? Melissa, she didn't know 
how it got on there; but. from the time of this alleged incident 
until she went into the emergency room she didn't shower or 
bathe. If my client were to (inaudible), she would have 
or there would have been DNA (inaudible). She claimed he was 
sucking hard on her neck. The purpose of the swab itself, when 
they took the swab, was to -- the nurse mentioned it. She took 
the swab right where Melissa claimed he was sucking on the 
neck, and that was the purpose of that. 
There was the vaginal swab. No male DNA was detected 
on the vaginal swab. She claims that my client had his finger 
in her vagina rubbing vigorously. She claimed that he was 
rubbing vigorously when they were stopped. However, she had 
contradicting testimony about en route to when they stopped, 
as I recall it. She initially testified yeah, he was rubbing 
vigorously as they were moving, but then she contradicted that 
and says, "Oh, no, he was just trying to insert his finger in 
my vagina, but there was no rubbing. The rubbing hadn't 
started to take place. Inconsistent testimonies. 
My client doesn't deny that he ejaculated, but he 
claims what happened was consensual sex. That was his testi-
mony. These facts bear it out. If you look at what happened 
from the time that party until the time they got to Zion's 
Call Center, the facts bear out this was consensual activity. 























have at any time. There was no inJuries or abrasions found on 
the neck, and no bruises or abrasions found in her pubic area, 
just on her labia, but she claimed he was vigorously inserting 
himself down the front of her pants. Hard to (i~audible). 
The SANE nurse in the r~ports and the testimony, 
there was never any complaint to them about anymore bruises 
or lacerations. The expert testified that these bruises and 
lacerations were not (inaudible). 
One (inaudible) is that Ms. Sorenson refused medication 
(inaudible) to deal with venereal diseases and those type of 
diseases. She was kissing -- he was kissing her, (inaudible) 
sticking his tongue in her mouth in and out, in and out several 
times. He had his finger in her vagina (inaudible). 
Jf she claimed that she was beaten by him why did she 
decline medications? She didn't know what type of disease he 
16 may have had. If you're being violated or been violated you 
17 would want medications. You may even beg for medications, 
18 something to take so you wouldn't get some type of disease, 
19 AIDS or whatever it may be. 
20 She admitted on the witness stand that (inaudible) 
21 there was no per.etration. It's in her own words, In the 
22 emergency room PA's report -- and this was what was reported 
23 from her, and chis was ·,1ord-fcr-wi:;rd from his report -- "She 
24 believes that t.he assailant would have been more forceful and 
25 penetration would have occurred if the patient was not on her 
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l period at that time.h 
2 Now, the PA got on the witness stand and he tried to 
3 say, "Oh, that was her - or that was his penis that he was 
4 talking about.• No, there was never anything mentioned of 
5 penis. I;: was digital penetration. She b~lieved the assailant 
6 would have been more forceful and that penetration would have 
7 occurred if the patient was not on her period at that time. 
8 Now, those were her words. Never anything about penis. It 
9 was always digital penetration. 
10 She also stated in her words, that is written in the 
11 report from the PA, that she hesitated in coming and reporting 
12 the incident because there was no actual penetration. That she 
13 was convinced by her friends that it was an assault that should 
14 have been reported. 
15 Another significant thing is when she was talking to 










about what had happened. No mention of penetration was made 
at that point. Only when the SANE nurse started asking her 
specific things did she mention, "Oh, yeah, penetration." 
I can relate that to the way that questioning are 
done with children. With children, they don't have leading 
questions, "Well, what about this? What about this? What 
abou;: this?" No, when they question children, they don't 
lead them. They just ask, 'Tell me what. happened about that," 




























that.u They dor:' t get ir:to :.he syec1£ics, HlrJe~l, did this 
happei:? Jid this happen? Did th~s happen? Did this happen? 
That's the s:tuation we have here with the SANE nurse 
when she was asked what happened. Did she me~t1on penetration? 
No. The nurse mentioned from tha: witness stand there was no 
mention of tha~ per1etra~~10;1 (1.naud:ble). 
Now to th&L !ao1~ ~nJuty. 
the age o! Lhe abrasion was (inaudible) two days old. So is it. 
possible ::.t ,:ould have bee:1 (1;,auc:2.hle)? L:ke:y not :.we days 
She .sai.rl, "The:3e ::.ype of inJuries heal fast." Appea:cs to 
-- then she stated, "This appears to be a fresh inJury." She 
also gave other scenarios li~audible). 
When she reported thin;s to the medical people she 
s2ij that she in t~1e reports, i:.he pulice repor.--:s, say she 
took him home after the (1na~dibleO. She took hirn home, ,,,hic:1 
{inc1Jdib:e). Joesr:' t 1r.,:1 ke ~en.se. All of 
these acts occurred when she's dr1v1ng hirn home. Again, she 
could have gotten out {ir.audible). 
Mr. Wa.ldosh's testimony was pretty consistent. It' s 
7hese were consensual 
eels ( inaut.Eble). She did noch1ng to get out cf harm's way. 
f'.f't:cr 




























citizens for the jury systeG. Reasonable doubt has been shown 
G 
these two days that adds ~p to a ~ot gui!ty verd:ct, because 
the State hasn't proven its case. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. VanDyke. 
G 
MF. './ANDYJ<E: Tl:=1n;,, you, your ,{onor. You kno1-1, ir, 
the 195G' s one of the ele1r,ents c,f rape 1-1asn' t just. t.hat it vias 
without consent of the victim, but the victim ~ad to show that 
she had resisted by fo:ce. Okay, now what does that mean? G 
That means if some guy ·,1alked up to a girl and said, "Hey, 
let's have sex,u and the girl says, "No,N and he made her do 
it any~-.,ay, that. it. 1.voulcin' t be a crime if she didr.' t try to Q 
resist him, okay? 
I..et' s not go back to that, okay? "No" means no; we'·Je 
all r.eard that, right'? If Mr. Leigh wants to -- I think he Q 
wants you to believe that because she didn': bite and scratch 
and yell and screa~ and de a~l sorts of ether things, that it's 
r.ot believah~e. \'Jell, 2-et me tel.l you, r:·,er; rape 'Jictim, every 
Q 
sexual assault victim is di!ferent in ~ow they :respond. Don't 
blame her for what happened to her. 
Now, Mr. Leigh says his client doesn't deny :hat he 
ejaculated. Well, of course he doesn't deny that. How could 0 
he deny thct ·,1hen you've got this DNA eY.pert that says, "Yeah, 
his sp~rm is o~ her. There's one in 7J0 qu1nt1llicn pe~ple 
that it could have been." Yeah, !twas him. Of course he's 































that could that he couldn't possibly deny; but all that 
stuff that he couldn't deny, he wculd have probably if he 
could have denied that, but the DNA evidence was conclusive 
so his story had to match. Of course he doesn't deny that. 
Now, the unknown sample of DNA that's skin DNA from 
the stain on the sweater may have come from skin, and that 
it's from the neck swabbing that could be saliva and coc:d be 
skin. The DNA expert so1ys, "Yeo1h, I can't tell you if Lhat' s 
the same person, but it could be the same person.u 
What's the most reasonable explanation for that? It 
was probably one of her kids. She has a sweater that she wears 
and she's at home with her kids and they brush up against her. 
Yeah, their skin's going to be all over her sweater, okay? If 
she's a good mom and she loves her kids, their DNA is going to 
be all over (inaudible), okay? 
We don't -- on her neck we don't know if that was 
saliva or skin that came from the u~known person, okay? It 
could have been her saliva. She laid in bed for two days. 
She cried a lot. Maybe she had snot running down her face 
because she was crying. Probably her own saliva. The skin 
probably came from her nwn face. We don't know. So let's not 
try and say that there is so~e other random person out there 
~hat committed this assault. I: was the defendant right here. 
Mr. Leigh wants to try ar.d point out differences 

















about something that happened to me. When I was a freshman in 
college, I went to the College of Eastern Utah, and my family 
lived in Orem, and I'd often go home on the weekends to see 
them. 
One time I had to get back to college and my car 
wasn't working, so I borrowed my brother's car, and I had 
another friend with me, and you know, we were driving way coo 
late at night, and we were driving through a really dangerous 
canyon. We came out around a corner and then there was a 
straight-of-way, a long straight-of-way. It was at the wrong 
time of year, and there was a semi coming the other direction, 
and my friend looks out and says, "There's people in the road. 
I think there's people walking across the road." 
I was driving way too fast. We get closer and it's 
hard to see because of the semi coming the other way. It kind 
16 of blinded me from what was in the road, and I passed the semi 
17 and wham, a huge elk, right, the biggest elk I'd ever seen in 
18 my life, and it comes and hits the front windshield and flips 
19 over and I slammed on my brakes and the elk lands on top of my 





in total shock, and I'm quiet for a minute, then I just scream. 
Then after a few minutes this elk comes to, and it 
gets off of my car and it starts to stand but its back is 
broken and it can't -- it can't walk too well. Eventually 



































still just sitting in the car just shocked. My friend gets 
out and pulls the deer off the road and then we wait for 
somebody to pick us up and take us home, right? 
Now, when we got to Price, to the college, I had to 
talk to a police officer and make a police report. Do you 
think l told him that same story that I just told you? To 
the police officer it was just facts, okay? I was driving. 
Probably didn't tell him I was speeding. You know, I told 
him just the facts. 
Then after I met with the police officer I got back 
to my dorm, and you know, it was freshman dorms, so you know, 
it was like 2 or 3 in the morning, there was still tons of kids 
out there. They could tell that I was still upset. They asked 
me what happened. So I went and told them the story. 
Partway into the story they started to laugh because 
of how I was telling it. It just seem -- you know, at that 
point it seemed like, oh, this funny thing, and my friend just 
getting out of the car and pulling the deer off the road. Do 
you think I told the story exactly the same as I did just now, 
or the same way I told it to the police officer? 
Does that mean it didn't happen? Does that mean I'm 
lying to you right now, or did I actually hit that deer? Did I 
actually total my brother's car? When I told him the story do 
you think I told him a little bit different? Does that mean it 





























Let's talk a little bit about the standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, okay? Le:'s talk about it. LeL rr,e 
talk about that standard. ! !:ve with that standard every day. 
As a prosec~tor 1f I can't prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a crime occurred, it. doesn't matter. :t's not something I 
should pursue. I have -- I have to meet that standard, okay? 
A lot of defense atLorneys like Mr. Leigh want you 
to think that that's kind ot an impossible standard for me tc 
reach, okay? So let me -- let me kind of explain how I view 
that standard. I was a kid growing up and if you're getting 
a little tired this is my last story, so just hang in :here --
we often had big family parties ac ~ew Year's, and I had one 
uncle who always did a jigsaw puzzle. G 
I didn't realJ.y care for doing them. I was too little 
to (inaudible) these !ictle teeny tiny pieces, 5,000, trying to 
make a (inaudible), but. it ·,1as all-,ay::, interesting, you know, 
to come and see him start and putting the edges oft.he puzzle 
together and start to form a picture. Then I would go, you 
know, play with some cousins, do sc11,e -- ,1at:ch a movie, do 
something else, come back a little bit later, (inaudible) more 
piecP.s of t:h~: puzzle VH) 1Jld stc-:rt r(~ form, okr:iy, what's t.his 
I would leave, come back, the!e's more puzzle pieces. 



























puzzle piece in there, but you can tell what the puzzle is, 
right? You can tell tha: this is, you know, a sunset off the 
coast of California; you can tell (inaudible), right, without 
ever seeing a puzzle piece in there. You can tell that it was, 
you know, a cat playing with a ball (inaudible}. Do you need 
every single puzzle piece to know beyond a reasonable doubt 
what that puzzle -- what that pic:~re 
No, you (inaudible), right? 
. ? 15. Absolutely not. 
Now, in this case there's lots of puzzle pieces. 
There's DNA evidence, there's -- you know, from her sweater, 
the actual sweater you can see where the DNA sample's cut off 
of the sweater. Is that conclusive in and of itself that this 
crime occurred? No, but that's a puzzle piece. We've got 
his hat that was left in her car. Is that super important? 
Probably not super important, but it's a little puzzle piece, 
okay? 
All of these little pieces of evidence, what you've 
heard today, are all little puzzle pieces, all of the pictures 
for. documentation from the SANE example. That she told her 
story to several different people and was consistent in the 
fact that she was sexually assaulted. Those are -- that's 
a lot of puzzle pieces. 
When you put those puzzle pieces together -- hopefully 
I've helped you enough to put those puzzle pieces together, 



























piece because you weren't there. You don't know what happened 
because you weren't there; but you have enough puzzle pieces 
today to find the defendant guilty of object rape and two 
counts of forcible sexual abuse. That's what I ask you to do 
today. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen, we will 
now excuse Mr. Franklin and Ms. Rasmussen. Can. I ask the 
bailiff to -- do you need to talk to him? 
MR. LEIGH: Just making sure I did something on the 
(inaudible) . 
THE COURT: We're going to have the bailiff gather up 
the exhibits and he'll bring to you in the jury room. I'm 
going to put the bailiff under oath to take -- keep track of 
you. I'll ask the clerk to do that now. 
COURT CLERK: Do you solemnly swear that you will take 
this jury to some convenient and private place to deliberate, 
allowing no one to speak to them, nor to do so yourself unless 
ordered, and to return them into Court when they have reached a 
verdict or when ordered (inaudible)? 
COURT CLERK: I do. 
THE COURT: All right, I do release you from the order 
not to talk and instruct you to start talking to each other. 
All right, Mr. Bailiff, will you take them. 
MR. VANDYKE: Your Honor, there is a -- the DVD video 
is already ill Lhere. 
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